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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on links between domestic financial 
development and economic growth. It starts with the pioneers in this field and then classifies 
two main schools favouring liberal financial regimes. First McKinnon and Shaw advocated 
financial liberalization in a period of widespread government intervention in credit markets. 
After that a period of criticism of free market regimes followed, partly based on unsuccessful 
policies. The literature on financial development and endogenous growth pushed the 
discussion back into the direction initially advocated by McKinnon and Shaw. We review a 
huge body of empirical literature, which generally finds positive associations between 
domestic financial development and economic growth. The evidence suggests, however, 
enormous heterogeneity across countries, regions, financial factors, and directions of 
causality. 
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NON-TECHNICAL  SUMMARY  
 
In this paper we review the theoretical and empirical literature on links between domestic 
financial development and economic growth.   
In the 1960s early pioneers like Goldsmith, Cameron, and Gerschenkron used crude 
econometric methods and case studies to explore the finance-growth nexus. They found rough 
associations between financial factors and output, but did not provide a strong enough theoretical 
fundament to answer the causality question. 
 In the 1970s McKinnon and Shaw developed a theoretical framework that helped to 
explain growth-inducing effects of financial liberalization in contrast to financial repression. 
They argued that the financial sector could raise the volume of savings as well as the quantity 
and quality of investment. This approach found only mixed empirical support and could not 
explain sustained increases in the growth rate of an economy either.   
The literature of the 1980s witnessed a return towards market critical approaches that 
were based on micro (market failure related) - and macroeconomic (neostructuralist) concerns. 
Mixed experiences with financial liberalization policies fuelled the surge in this type of literature. 
 The answer economic theory gave to these questions was incorporated in the 
endogenous growth literature of the 1990s. It emphasizes the role of financial development in 
generating sustained growth through an external effect on aggregate investment efficiency. Some 
authors have developed a framework for reciprocal externalities between the financial and the 
real sector.  Much empirical support has been found for the “finance promotes growth” view, but 
time-series evidence is less clear-cut than broad cross-section analysis. A majority of studies, 
however, comes to the conclusion that finance induces growth in early stages of economic 
development and vice versa in more advanced stages. A lot of evidence for bi-directional 
causality has been found as well.  A specific role has been attributed to stock markets, but here in 
particular, the evidence is mixed.   
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1. Introduction 
 
For almost a century economists have been debating the role of the financial sector in the 
process of economic development. Since Schumpeter (1911) put forward arguments pointing at 
the productivity- and growth-enhancing effects of the services provided by a developed financial 
sector, a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical literature has emerged. Initially this 
literature focused on the question whether the financial sector plays a causal role in economic 
development or if financial intermediaries merely originate from rapid industrialization. Put 
forward by Joan Robinson (1952), the latter point of view played a dominant role until the mid- 
1960s. Gerschenkron (1962), Patrick (1966), and particularly Goldsmith (1969), stressed the 
propulsive role the financial sector can play in the process of economic development. Even 
though this pioneering work broke ground to change the direction of thinking, the causality 
question has remained an important issue in the theoretical debate ever since. 
In the 1970s the discussion concentrated on the phenomenon of financial repression, a 
policy conducted by many governments to generate growth and revenue through artificially low 
interest rates and inflationary monetary policies. It was based on the theoretical works of Keynes 
(1936) and Tobin (1965), who advocated government interference in the credit market.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) coincidentally raised arguments against policies of financial 
repression. They emphasized the role of the financial sector in increasing the volume of savings 
by creating appropriate incentives. In order to reach higher savings and investment rates, they 
recommended governments to abolish interest rate ceilings and advised them to give up raising 
seignorage through inflationary monetary policies. As a result real interest rates should rise to 
market clearing values, thus raising increased savings. An important feature of the McKinnon-
Shaw models is that they explain only temporarily higher growth rates. Many governments in 
developing countries followed their policy advice and achieved significant accelerations in 
growth rates, but sometimes also excessively high and volatile real interest rates. 
In the early 1980s the Neostructuralists criticized the McKinnon-Shaw school and 
predicted that financial liberalization would slow down growth. Their arguments are in the vein 
of those put forward by Keynes and Tobin. Joseph Stiglitz (1989) criticizes financial 
liberalization on the theoretical ground of market failures in financial markets. 
A different strand of the theory that positively links finance and growth emerged in the 
early 1990s as a branch of the literature on endogenous growth. King and Levine (1993 b) follow 
Schumpeter's line of reasoning by emphasizing the role of innovation. Financial systems channel 
savings to their most productive uses and diversify the risks associated with these activities.  
Fulfilling these tasks, they increase the probability of successful innovation and the speed of 
technological progress. The most important result of the literature on endogenous growth is that 
the increase in growth rates can be sustained. In contrast to the school of thought based on 
 2 
physical capital accumulation (McKinnon, Shaw, 1973) the rate of technological progress is 
endogenously determined. This keeps the marginal productivity of capital from declining. Levine 
(1997) summarizes the following basic functions of financial systems that foster capital 
accumulation and productivity growth: they facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying, and 
pooling of risk; they allocate resources; they monitor managers and exert corporate control; they 
mobilize savings; and facilitate the exchange of goods and services. 
In this paper we shall proceed in three steps: In part 2. we summarize the pioneering 
literature on financial development and growth. Part 3. is concerned with the basic ideas of 
McKinnon and Shaw, as well as the extensions to their initial work. In section 4 we review the 
critiques of financial liberalization policies, namely those grounded on macroeconomic 
foundations (Neostructuralists) and those rooted in microeconomic theory.  Part 5. examines the 
literature on finance and endogenous growth. Section 6 discusses the empirical evidence. The 
final section summarizes our main findings. 
 
2. The 1960s: Pioneers in finance and growth 
 
In the academic debate on the relationship between finance and growth Keynesianist 
arguments in favour of financial repression dominated for many years. Before the 1960s theory 
overwhelmingly provided support for the hypothesis that financial development followed from 
growth and not vice versa. Gerschenkron (1962) put the role of the banking sector into the 
context of what he called "economic backwardness". According to his hypothesis a country's 
degree of economic development at the beginning of industrialization determined the role of its 
banking sector. In England, the most advanced economy, industrialization didn't need an active 
financial sector, because investment was small-scale and needed little capital and specialized 
entrepreneurship. Germany, a moderately backward country, entered industrialization when 
technology was more advanced and investment had a large scale. The banking sector provided 
both capital and entrepreneurship to drive the industrialization process. Russia, even more 
backward, needed a strong financial sector and the leading force of the government to put large-
scale, capital- intensive industries on track.  Patrick (1966) focused even more specifically than 
Gerschenkron on the question of the causal relationships between finance and growth. He 
identified two patterns that he dubbed “demand following” and “supply leading”, and attributed 
them to specific stages of the development process. In the first of the two patterns, economic 
development establishes a demand for financial services, which is passively satisfied by a 
growing financial sector. Rapid aggregate growth increases the demand for external funds.  If the 
variance in growth across sectors or industries is great there will be more demand for financial 
services to transfer savings to the leading sectors. In the second pattern, however, financial 
intermediation induces economic growth by channelling savings of mostly small savers to large 
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investors. The financial sector channels resources from the traditional to the modern sectors and 
promotes entrepreneurship in the latter. In Patrick's view, the second, supply-leading pattern, 
dominates during the early stages of economic development, and subsequently gradually shifts 
its leading role to the demand following one. So initially the causality runs from finance to 
growth, a scenario that should be expected in developing countries. The demand-following 
pattern should then be expected to establish a causality that runs from growth to finance. More 
advanced economies may accordingly be expected to exhibit this direction of causality. With his 
framework Patrick provided a clear-cut, and empirically testable hypothesis. 
Rondo Cameron (1967) argues that financial systems may be both growth-inducing and 
growth- induced, but he emphasizes the crucial role of the quality of its services and the 
efficiency with which they are provided. He subsequently summarizes important features of the 
financial system, in particular of banks: Financial intermediation serves as a vehicle for 
channelling small funds from risk-averse savers to less risk-averse people with entrepreneurial 
skills, which results in increased availability of funds for the latter. Secondly financial 
intermediation provides incentives to investors. Declining costs of borrowing encourage 
entrepreneurs to make larger investments. An expanding financial sector should reduce the 
dispersion of interest rates among users, regions, and over periods of seasonal fluctuation. 
Thirdly, financial institutions create possibilities for a more efficient allocation of the often-
unproductive stock of initial wealth in the early stages of industrialization. Finally he emphasizes 
the role of banks in promoting technological progress. Cameron argues, that the majority of 
technical innovations are introduced by established firms with access to bank financing. 
Cameron's primary merit, however, doesn't lie in his theoretical considerations. He provides 
detailed case studies of the interactions of finance and growth in the successful industrialization 
processes in England, Scotland, France, Belgium, Germany, Russia and Japan in the 19th 
century. The comparison of these case studies highlights some striking similarities and 
differences: In England the authorities were very cautious in allowing the financial sector to play 
a constructive role in promoting growth. But lax administration and sufficiently loose law made 
financial innovation not impossible. So these financial innovations contributed significantly to 
rapid industrialization. In Scotland the contribution of finance to industrialization was even more 
striking. Given policies favouring freedom and competition, banks developed financial 
innovations like the cash credit system and engaged directly in industry. Banking in Scotland, 
together with a developed educational system, contributed strongly to the process of industrial 
development, and sustained very high growth rates for a long time. In France the insufficiently 
developed banking system impeded more rapid industrialization in the first half of the 19th 
century. Restrictions on credit volume, a too small number of bank offices and not enough 
variety and specialization of financial institutions were the main reasons for the retarded 
economic development, effectively caused by the monopolistic position of the Banque de 
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France. In the second half of the century some financial reforms were put underway, but many 
restrictions remained. The Belgian financial system at that time featured some major innovations, 
like the creation of the first joint-stock bank, which was designed to promote the process of 
industrial development. Despite some shortcomings (e.g. the neglect of short-term commercial 
credit before 1851) the Belgian financial system promoted growth in a similar way as the 
Scottish, even though it featured significantly less competition than the latter. In Germany before 
1870 private banks were the most important financial institutions that mobilized capital for 
industrial development. They were often closely allied with industrial enterprises, so that they 
demanded and supplied credit at the same time, thus playing a propulsive role in economic 
development. The expansion of the Prussian Bank, however, retarded progress with its restrictive 
policies. In general the German experience shows the importance of competition in banking, 
which was lacking to a substantial degree in that period. In Russia banking induced economic 
development more than in many other countries. Banks mobilized enormous resources that 
would otherwise have remained idle. Various types of public and private financial institutions 
jointly mobilized capital for industry and the money supply was subject to a very rigid system of 
note issue. Between 1868 and World War I Japan established a financial system that stimulated 
economic development. Banks had close ties with the industry and engaged primarily in funding 
long-term fixed investment and working capital. According to Patrick's terminology the Japanese 
banking system was  “supply- leading” in that period. 
Two groups of countries emerge from the analysis: In Scotland, Belgium, Russia and 
Japan the financial sector actively promoted industrialization, while in Germany (before 1870) 
and France financial development was inhibited by wrong policies. In England inappropriate 
policies couldn't prevent rapid financial development and innovation.  In this group of countries, 
however, finance exhibited a rather “demand-following” pattern. Cameron et al. (1972) provide 
more case studies of countries that either did not achieve a significant level of industrialization 
before 1914 (Serbia, Spain), or countries with an incomplete and delayed industrialization 
(Austria, Italy), and finally countries with a rapid pace of economic development (USA, Japan). 
Austria's financial system is found to have played a counter-productive role during the process of 
industrialization because of the unwillingness of bankers to take appropriate risks. In addition to 
that, protectionist trade policies gave rise to less aggressive behaviour of banks and 
entrepreneurs. Since other wrong policies undermined the effectiveness of the financial system 
as well, it can be concluded that financial conditions hampered growth. In Serbia the insufficient 
pace of industrialization was rather a result of a general lack of managerial and entrepreneurial 
skills than of an underdeveloped financial system. The latter had achieved a surprisingly 
sophisticated structure after a few years of independence only. In Italy the financial instability 
induced by excessive government borrowing seemed to have hindered private domestic capital 
accumulation significantly. In the case of Spain the financial system couldn't sustain 
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industrialization because the political authorities forced it to be preoccupied with public finance 
and railway construction. Studies of the USA, especially Louisiana, and, again, Japan provide 
striking evidence of a growth- inducing role of the financial sector. This second set of cases 
studies shows how inappropriate financial sector policies inhibited the process of 
industrialization in several countries, but also that finance cannot compensate bottlenecks in 
other sectors.  
Goldsmith (1969) asserts that the positive effect of financial intermediation on growth 
could be due to increasing both the efficiency and the volume of investment, even though he 
assigns a less important role to the latter2. He was the first to provide significant empirical 
evidence about the correlation of finance and growth for a cross-section of countries. By 
constructing a measure of financial development, defined as the value of all financial assets over 
GNP (called FIR or financial interrelations ratio 3), Goldsmith broke ground for later empirical 
research conducted in that field.  For a sample of 35 developed, developing, and socialist 
countries he finds a rough positive correlation between the financial development variable and 
GNP per capita, both measured for the early 1960s. The result is yet slightly spoilt by the 
existence of several outliers: Japan, Italy, and the UK had a much higher, and the Soviet Union a 
much lower value of FIR then their respective levels of national wealth would make believe.  For 
four countries, Germany, Japan, the US, and the UK Goldsmith gives additional evidence: Over 
a period of about 100 years (1860-1963) the association of FIR and output was not only rough 
across these countries, but even within each country long-run relationships seemed to have been 
subject to some accident.  
The studies of Gerschenkron, Patrick, Cameron, and Goldsmith triggered an ongoing 
academic debate that affected policy makers in developing and developed countries alike. Their 
theoretical framework was still relatively unsophisticated and empirical evidence for a significant 
relationship between finance and growth remained rough. Yet they induced a surge of interest in 
the subject. 
 
3. The 1970s: The McKinnon-Shaw school 
3.1. The characteristics of financial repression and its rationale  
 
Financial repression is the main focus of the McKinnon-Shaw school. They assert that 
this policy is harmful for long-run growth because it reduces the volume of funds available for 
investment. Before we turn to the more detailed description of the McKinnon-Shaw school, we 
                                                                 
2 See Goldsmith (1969), pp. 391-401, in particular p. 398. This assumption anticipated the results of a majority of 
econometric studies. 
3 See Goldsmith (1969), pp. 86-100 for the exact composition of the FIR formula. 
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therefore briefly summarize the main characteristics of this policy and explain why it has been 
conducted in many developing countries. 
Financial repression is the combination of indiscriminate nominal interest rate ceilings  
and high and accelerating inflation. High reserve requirements may also play a role. It was based 
on the theoretical grounds of the liquidity preference theory propagated by Keynes (1936): The 
full-employment equilibrium level of the real interest rate, he argued, tended to be lower than the 
one generated by liquidity preference. So interest rates had to be lowered in order to avoid a fall 
in income. In Tobin's model (1965) there are small household producers who allocate their 
wealth among money and productive capital. Financial repression reduces the demand for money 
in favour of productive capital, thus raising the capital/labour ratio and accelerating economic 
growth. Neostructuralists argue that high interest rates increase inflation in the short run through 
cost-push effects and decelerate economic growth as a result of a reduced real credit volume (we 
will turn to the Neostructuralist view in more detail later). 
These theoretical considerations are, however, complemented by policy requirements in 
developing countries. If the government is unable to collect sufficient tax revenue, it imposes 
financial repression measures as an implicit tax on the financial sector. Fry (1995) states that 
financial repression is a severe and unintended form of financial restriction, which he considers 
as a second-best policy for governments with low tax-raising power. In the case of financial 
restriction, financial institutions and instruments are given a priority treatment if the government 
can relatively easily extract seignorage from them. Reserve requirements, obligatory holdings of 
government bonds, or interest rate ceilings help the authorities in diverting savings to the public 
sector at low or zero costs. The banking and credit sector is most appropriate for that because it is 
more difficult to extract seignorage from the private equity and bond market.  
 
3.2. Financial liberalization in the McKinnon-Shaw school 
 
In 1973 both Ronald McKinnon and Edward Shaw launched an attack on the dominant 
theoretical schools of financial repression advocates. Contradicting Keynes and Tobin, they 
argue in favour of interest rate liberalization and abolition of other financial repression policy 
measures. Their basic model comprises financial intermediaries, savers and investors. It is an 
inside money model, because loans to the private sector are backed by the internal debt of the 
private sector. The nominal interest rate is fixed, holding the real rate below its equilibrium level. 
Saving is a positive and investment a negative function of the real interest rate. When the latter is 
driven down by either accelerating inflation or a decrease in the fixed nominal interest rate, 
saving will decrease. The inflation effect is sustained by another argument: If inflation is hedged 
by land ownership, the decrease in the real interest rate will stimulate demand for land, because 
deposits become less attractive. The shift in savings from bank accounts to land ownership drives 
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land prices up faster than the general price level.  The induced wealth effect causes an increase in 
consumption, and, accordingly, a decline in investment. If there is financial repression in terms 
of a nominal interest rate fixed below the market clearing value, two scenarios are possible. If 
only the deposit rate is fixed, there will be a large spread between lending and deposit rates.  In 
the case of loan and deposit rate ceilings, which is the more realistic scenario for developing 
countries, nonprice rationing of funds must take place. Credit allocation is determined by criteria 
like transaction costs, perceived risks of default, quality of collateral, political influence, 
reputation, loan size, and covert benefits to loan officers instead of expected investment 
productivity. The average efficiency of investment is reduced because investments with lower 
returns become profitable after the loan rate ceiling has been set at a sufficiently low level. 
Adverse selection takes place because entrepreneurs enter the market, who didn’t request credit 
before the ceiling was set. Risk taking behaviour of banks is affected negatively, because risk 
premia cannot be charged. Credit allocation is to some extent subject to randomness, which is 
another factor of distortion. The policy prescription proposed by McKinnon and Shaw is 
therefore to abolish institutional constraints on nominal interest rates and to reduce inflation. 
Even though McKinnon and Shaw essentially come to the same conclusions, their 
theoretical approaches feature some differences. McKinnon’s model rests on the assumptions 
that all economic units are limited to self-finance and that there are important indivisibilities in 
investment. He makes no distinction between savers (households) and firms (investors). An 
investor must accumulate deposits or other financial assets in advance in order to invest later. So 
there is an intertemporal complementarity of deposits and physical capital. Since investors 
cannot borrow to finance investment, McKinnon’s model is sometimes also interpreted as an 
outside money model4.  
In Shaw’s model there is no necessity for complementarity, because investors are not 
confined to self-finance. He provides an explicit inside money approach. Financial 
intermediaries sustain deposit accumulation by raising real returns to savers and thus expand 
their lending potential. At the same time they lower real costs to investors through risk 
diversification, economies of scale in lending, improved operational efficiency, lower 
information costs to savers and investors, and accommodation of liquidity preference.  
McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis and Shaw’s debt-intermediation view, 
however, do not necessarily contradict each other, because investment may be financed both 
externally and internally. McKinnon refers rather to developing countries whereas Shaw’s 
analysis describes the scenario of more advanced economies with sophisticated financial 
systems. 
                                                                 
4 In contrast to inside money outside money is backed by loans to the government and not by the internal debt of 
the private sector. If money is only outside money, banks hold government bonds and make no loans to the 
private sector, see for instance Fry (1995), p.17 for definitions of the two money concepts. 
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In the aftermath of the McKinnon-Shaw debate, a number of studies has emerged that 
extend the original framework in specific ways. Kapur (1976), Galbis (1977), Mathieson (1980), 
and Fry (1980) develop formal macroeconomic models, in which financial repression is exerted 
by national authorities through fixing the deposit  (not the loan) rate of interest below its market 
clearing value. Money demand depends on the (fixed) nominal interest rate and on inflation. 
Accelerating inflation reduces real money demand. The banks' liabilities contract in real terms 
and consequently also its assets, which reduces the supply of credit for investment. Using 
portfolio terminology, inflation reduces growth because households are induced to hold 
unproductive inflation hedges instead of financing productive investment through deposits.  
Kapur and Mathieson introduce a specific type of financial repression: Even if interest 
rates are not subject to ceilings, the same effect is reached by reserve requirements. Assuming 
zero inflation, a fixed required reserve ratio puts a ceiling on the deposit rate. Inflation increases 
the wedge between loan and deposit rates even further5. The policy implication in this context is 
that reduced reserve requirements at a given inflation rate increase the scope of the banking 
system for lending activities. Besides a lower reserve requirement raises the deposit rate ceiling 
at any given loan rate. The demand for deposits increases and the financial sector expands. In the 
Kapur-Mathieson framework there is a developing economy with a labour surplus and a 
production technology of the following Harrod-Domar type: KY s= . Y represents real output, K  
is total utilized fixed and working capital, and s stands for a constant output/capital ratio. Only 
the quantity of investment ( KD ) is affected by the financial sector, not the quality. Fry and 
Galbis extend the framework to allow the real deposit rate of interest to influence also s by 
raising the average efficiency of investment.  In Galbis's two-sector model for instance, financial 
repression leads to a sustained co-existence of a traditional sector with a low constant rate of 
return to capital, and a modern sector with a higher rate of return. A low deposit rate leads to 
high self- financed investment in the traditional sector. Increasing the deposit rate raises money 
demand in this sector and thus allows higher investment in the modern sector financed from bank 
loans. This change in the composition of investment raises the average efficiency of investment. 
In Fry's model the deposit rate also has an impact on the level of investment.  
In all models of the McKinnon-Shaw type the deposit rate that maximizes growth is the 
one that results from a free-market equilibrium. The authors recommend to abolish interest rate 
ceilings, to give up selective or directed credit programmes, to reduce reserve requirements, and, 
very importantly, to ensure competitive conditions in the financial sector.  
Kapur, Mathieson and Fry also develop dynamic models capable of illustrating the 
effects of interest rate liberalization as a means of stabilization policy. They come to the 
conclusion that, starting from a situation of financial repression, interest rate liberalization has a 
                                                                 
5 See Fry (1989), p. 16, for a detailed description of the mechanism through which inflation and reserve 
requirements cause financial repression. 
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double advantage. Apart from exerting a positive effect on long-run growth, financial 
liberalization reduces the contractionary effects of monetary stabilization programmes. 
 
4. The 1980s: Critiques of financial liberalization policies 
4.1. Neostructuralists 
 
As a result of mixed experiences with financial liberalization policies the Neostructuralist 
school emerged, which criticized financial deregulation from a macroeconomic point of view. 
Taylor (1983) and van Wijnbergen (1982, 1983 a, b) most prominently put forward two 
arguments, one of which is specific to developing economies. In their models curb or 
unorganised money markets play a crucial role in determining whether financial liberalization 
can accelerate growth or not.  If an increase in the real deposit interest rate leads to a shift of 
assets from the unorganised to the formal credit market, the existence of reserve requirements 
will lead to a decline in financial intermediation. In the unorganised money market reserve 
requirements do not exist. The extent of the contractionary effect on credit supply is determined 
by the degree to which assets are substituted out of inflation hedges or out of the curb market. 
The second argument is based on cost-push inflation resulting from increased interest rates, 
which may lead to a collapse of effective demand. Even if financial intermediation does not 
shrink the second argument is still valid, particularly because an increased propensity to save 
may weaken effective demand even more. The neostructuralist models, however, rest on the 
assumption that unorganised money markets are competitive which may not be the case. Another 
problematic feature of these models is that they consider the aggregate credit and investment 
volume and not investment efficiency. The latter may be enhanced by an increase in credit costs. 
 
4.2. Market imperfections  
 
Another group of authors focussed their attention on microeconomic underpinnings of 
macroeconomic policies. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), for instance, show that disequilibria in the 
credit market may have causes other than government intervention. The authors show that the 
price of credit may affect the nature of the transaction, and may therefore not clear the market. 
The result is derived from an adverse selection effect and an incentive effect.  High and market 
clearing interest rates may attract bad borrowers or induce borrowers to undertake more risky 
investment projects. Consequently borrowers are more likely to default. This may lead banks not 
to raise the interest rate to its market clearing level.  As a result credit rationing may occur where 
only large size loans are allocated. Similarly excess supply equilibria are conceivable. These 
adverse outcomes are due to microeconomic shortcomings of a free credit market.  
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Adverse selection may also be an issue in its own right. Mankiw (1986) discusses the 
problem of financial collapse in this context. He presents a model in which small changes in the 
interest rate may alter the riskiness of the pool of borrowers.  This may lead to a collapse of the 
credit market if the pool of loan applicants is too risky to give the banks their required return. On 
top of that restrictive monetary policy may do more than move the economy along the marginal 
efficiency of capital schedule.  It can also cause a financial crisis at the extreme.   
Principal-agent problems are examined by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Stiglitz 
(1985). In the context of a corporation with many small owners they argue that it may not pay 
any of them to monitor the management.  This free-rider problem arises from the public good 
character of the costly information acquisition of an individual stockholder who may easily 
liquidate his financial commitment.  
Yet another strand of the literature related to market failure addresses the issue of 
asymmetric information in credit markets. Banks emerge as a result of information asymmetries 
between lenders and borrowers. In the costly state verification approach (e.g. Diamond, 1984) 
financial intermediaries can verify the success of investment only at a monitoring cost, which 
they try to minimize. Information asymmetries are are a problem because they may lead to 
capital misallocations and monitoring costs. As shown by Williamson (1987 a), the latter may 
cause equilibrium credit rationing even in the absence of other market failures. 
Moral hazard is an issue often discussed with respect to deposit insurance schemes. 
Originally designed to correct negative externalities running from banks’ business activities to 
their customers, deposit insurance may cause yet another type of market failure. It may 
encourage risk taking by bank managers. Gennotte and Pyle (1991), for instance, show that 
implementing more stringent capital requirements in the presence of deposit insurance may lead 
to an increase in asset risk. Monitoring and control of asset risk through the regulation authorities 
must counteract this. 
 
5. The 1990s: Finance and endogenous growth 
 
In the 1990s research on the relationship between financial development and long-run 
growth received new impulses from the literature on endogenous growth. A branch of this stream 
started to focus on the question whether financial conditions could explain sustained growth in 
per capita GDP. The central argument is that finance generates an external effect on aggregate 
investment efficiency, which offsets the decrease in the marginal product of capital. Some 
studies consider the role of stock markets exclusively.  
 In most studies the model structure is of the AK type (Romer, 1986), in the sense that 
there are constant returns to a sufficiently broad concept of capital. Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991), for instance, present a model where savings are channelled to more productive activities 
 11 
by allowing investors to adjust the composition of their assets towards the illiquid growth-
enhancing ones. Individuals face uncertainty about their future liquidity needs and therefore hold 
two types of assets: a liquid one, which is safe but unproductive, or an illiquid one with high 
productivity and risk. The existence of financial intermediaries shifts the composition of assets 
towards the more risky one and therefore increases growth. Financial institutions allow 
individuals to reduce the risk associated with their liquidity needs. In spite of the uncertainty 
individuals face about future liquidity needs, banks face a predictable demand for liquidity from 
their depositors as a result of the law of large numbers. Accordingly banks are enabled to allocate 
investment funds more efficiently. Furthermore socially unnecessary capital liquidation can be 
reduced because individuals are no longer forced to liquidate investment in the presence of 
financial intermediaries. In a similar vein Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr (1995) show that 
financial institutions reduce liquidity risk to which savers are exposed by making financial assets 
tradable (stock markets) or by enabling depositors to withdraw cash before a project’s maturity 
(banks). This reduces the disincentive to investing in long-run projects.  The lowering of 
transaction costs in financial markets is crucial to their analysis.  
A number of papers include the possibility of reciprocal externalities between finance 
and growth, which allows for multiple equilibria and poverty traps. Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) develop a model in which financial intermediation and growth are both endogenous. The 
authors assume a positive two-way causal relationship between financial development and 
growth. On the one hand, financial institutions collect and analyse information in order to find 
the investment opportunities with the highest return. They channel funds to the most productive 
uses, thereby increasing the efficiency of investment and growth. But the effect of financial 
institutions is twofold: The return individuals get is not only higher, but also safer, because the 
financial system insures investors against idiosyncratic risk. On the other hand, growth provides 
the means needed to implement and develop a costly financial structure. Saint-Paul (1992) 
analyses the effects of financial markets on technological choice and the division of labour. In 
this model agents can choose between two technologies: The first is flexible and allows 
productive diversification, but has low productivity. The second is rigid, more specialized and 
productive. In the presence of shocks to consumer preferences (possibly leading to lack of 
demand for certain products) and without financial institutions, risk-averse individuals may 
prefer technological flexibility instead of high productivity.  Financial markets allow individuals 
to hold a diversified portfolio in order to insure themselves against negative demand shocks, and 
to opt for the more productive technology. This fosters a greater division of labour. The model 
allows for multiple equilibria: In the “low” equilibrium financial markets are underdeveloped 
and people therefore choose less productive, but flexible technologies. With these technologies 
there is not much risk exposure and the incentives to develop financial markets are limited. The 
economy is trapped in a state of underdevelopment. In the “high” equilibrium financial markets 
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are developed and technology is specialized and risky. This creates a need for financial markets. 
The model is then extended to consider multiple growth paths and divergence across identical 
countries. Berthélemy and Varoudakis (1996) introduce reciprocal externalities between the 
financial sector and the real sector into a learning-by-doing endogenous growth framework. They 
assume a positive influence of the financial sector on capital efficiency and thus on growth and 
an external effect of the real on the financial sector via the volume of savings. The mechanisms 
work as follows: First the financial sector channels savings to more productive uses by collecting 
and analysing information about investment opportunities. In return, the expansion of the real 
sector causes an increased volume of savings. The increased size of the financial market induces 
more competition and technical efficiency through learning-by doing in the financial sector. This 
two-way causality gives rise to a cumulative process, which causes multiple equilibria. 
Insufficient financial development might be a reason for the emergence of poverty traps.  
King and Levine (1993 b) develop a Schumpeterian model of technological progress 
similar to Romer (1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991), with cost-reducing inventions 
applying to an intermediate product. Financial intermediaries and securities markets enable 
particular entrepreneurs to undertake innovative activity, which affects growth through 
productivity enhancement.  Financial systems affect entrepreneurial activities in four ways: They 
evaluate entrepreneurs, pool resources, diversify risk and value the expected profits from 
innovative activities. Better financial systems increase the probability of successful innovation. 
Distortions like deposit rate ceilings or high reserve requirements reduce the rate of innovation.  
Another group of studies is concerned with issues like government interventions in the 
credit market or market failure. The respective authors put these “old” issues into the “new“ 
framework of endogenous growth. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), for instance, re-examine 
financial repression the context of an AK model of endogenous growth with non-decreasing 
returns to capital. In their model governments might opt for policies of financial repression in 
order to generate easy inflationary revenues. Financial repression induces individuals to carry a 
larger stock of nominal money, which is the base for the inflation tax. Given a high income tax 
subject to tax evasion, governments choose to repress the financial sector and to accelerate 
inflation. Growth is reduced because of the negative effect of financial repression on the 
productivity of capital and the quantity of savings.  Mattesini (1996) proposes a different 
approach to financial development and economic growth. He develops a simple overlapping 
generations model where the credit market is characterized by asymmetric information. Like in 
Roubini/Sala- i-Martin production is based on a Romer (1986) constant returns to scale 
technology. One determinant of growth is the level of monitoring costs of financial institutions, a 
parameter representing the efficiency of the intermediation system. This parameter is 
approximated by the spread between lending and borrowing rates in order to conduct empirical 
analysis. High monitoring costs are assumed to reduce the rate of economic growth, i.e. spreads 
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and growth are expected to be negatively correlated.  Bencivenga and Smith (1993) present 
another endogenous growth model of the AK type related to market failure. In this model credit 
rationing and growth are jointly determined with permanent adverse effects on economic 
development.  
A significantly large number of studies have been written about the importance of stock 
markets for the development process. We will review these studies separately because they partly 
yield different results for banking and stock market activities and show that banks and securities 
markets provide different services. Atje and Jovanovic (1993) for instance, do not develop an 
endogenous growth model, but use the approach of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990, s.a.) and 
apply it to stock markets. The stock market insures investors against idiosyncratic risk and 
creates more information about investment projects. In return growth fosters the development of 
stock markets. The model developed by Greenwood and Jovanovic is a genuine endogenous 
growth model, implying no diminishing returns to capital as a result of financial intermediation. 
Levine (1991) constructs an endogenous growth model in which a stock market permanently 
accelerates growth by assuming two functions: it reduces liquidity risk and productivity risk. 
Without stock markets, risk-averse investors might be deterred from investing in a firm because 
of firm-specific productivity shocks. Stock markets insure investors against this idiosyncratic 
risk by allowing them to hold diversified portfolios. This circumstance raises the fraction of 
resources allocated to the firm. Secondly, liquidity shocks might force agents to prematurely sell 
assets at a low liquidation return. The stock market reduces that risk, because ownership can be 
transferred more easily and at better conditions. This reduction of liquidity risk encourages firm 
investment and thus indirectly accelerates growth. Premature removal of firm capital can be 
avoided so that unnecessary shocks to technological innovation need not take place. This 
increases firm productivity and directly stimulates growth. The model also shows that impeding 
or taxing financial market activity has a negative impact on long-run growth. 
 
6. Empirical evidence 
6.1. Financial liberalization, savings, and investment 
 
Empirical evidence of the Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis has been rather mixed, indicating 
that financial liberalization alone is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for improving the 
economic performance of developing countries.  Most generally, financial liberalization seems to 
exert a significantly positive influence on the quality of investment rather than its quantity and 
the volume of savings. On top of that macroeconomic stability and sound regulation of the 
banking sector seem to play a crucial role for the success of financial liberalization. Sharp 
monetary restriction in the context of financial liberalization may furthermore lead to 
prohibitively high real interest rates. Eventually the combined impact of several factors may lead 
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to financial collapse. An overview of the empirical findings discussed in this section can be 
found in Table A1. of the Appendix. 
A number of empirical assessments have been published on the relation between real 
interest rates and saving. In a study using US time-series data for the 1929 -1969 period, Boskin 
(1978) comes to the conclusion that savings are highly interest elastic. Fry (1978) finds a similar 
effect using pooled time-series data of seven Asian LDCs for 1962-1972 . Giovannini (1983), 
however, is unable to reproduce this result for the same countries as Fry for a different period 
(1964-1980). He attributes this to serious data and specification problems which make the 
regression results difficult to interpret.  De Melo and Tybout (1986) report mixed results as to the 
interest-saving  nexus. In their study of Uruguay for the 1962-1983 period they find a significant 
upward shift of saving following financial sector reforms in 1973, but only a small interest 
elasticity of saving in general. Moreover, they find no interest elasticity for the post-reform 
period (the effect found is a level shift immediately after the reform). This indicates that saving 
may be interest elastic as long as financial repression is in place. Interest rate increases may then 
have a much larger marginal impact on saving behaviour. Gupta (1986) uses a simultaneous 
equation model to examine the role of financial liberalization in India and South Korea. In spite 
of significant differences in the two countries’ experiences, the results show that financial 
liberalization has a positive impact on financial development and economic growth. The 
differences refer to the liberalization strategies rather than to the liberalization as such: In India 
nominal interest rate increases had a stronger impact on various measures of private savings than 
a decrease in inflation, while Korea exhibited the opposite pattern. The overall result, however, 
supports the hypothesis that financial repression is a serious impediment to economic growth. In 
a later study, however, Gupta (1987) cannot confirm the generality of this finding. For pooled 
time-series and cross-section data of 22 Asian and Latin American countries covering the period 
1967-1976, he finds a significant interest elasticity of saving only for the Asian subsample. 
Athukorala and Rajapatirana (1993) look at the Sri Lankan experience and find that for the post-
liberalization period (1978-1987) there is a significant impact of interest rates on various 
indicators of saving as well as an enormous level shift directly following reforms. In a case study 
of the United Kingdom for the 1971-1988 period Bayoumi (1993) shows that financial 
liberalization reduced the savings rate, the reduction being partly temporary and partly 
permanent. He attributes this fact to the relaxation of credit constraints. The impact of financial 
liberalization thus seems to depend on the degree of previous financial repression, which may 
have been higher in Sri Lanka than in the UK.  In two similar approaches Warman and Thirlwall 
(1994) and Athukorala (1998) come to rather opposite conclusions. For the case of Mexio over 
the period 1960-1990 the former find a positive impact of real interest rates on financial savings 
alone. But it operates mainly through substitution of other assets with financial asset and through 
capital flight. The latter reports a positive impact of interest rates on all kinds of savings (total, 
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private and financial) for India in the period 1955-1995, even though a weaker one for total 
saving (which includes the public sector). He is not able, however, to detect significant evidence 
for asset substitution as predicted by neostructuralists.   
Evidence for the interest elasticity of investment is also rather mixed.  De Melo and 
Tybout (1986) show a positive association between real interest rates and investment for 
Uruguay’s post-liberalization period and an upward shift of investment directly following 
financial reforms.  Using a sample of 34 countries over the 1965-1985 period, Gelb (1989) 
provides cross-section evidence indicating that real interest rates foster growth not primarily 
through increasing the quantity of investment. Laumas (1990) finds a positive relationship 
between private investment and the real interest rate for India over the period 1954-1975. 
Rittenberg (1991) makes an interesting contribution to the literature with a study about Turkey 
over the 1964-1986 period. Negative (i.e. below equilibrium) real interest rates are found to be 
positively associated with investment, while the opposite holds for positive (above equilibrium) 
real interest rates.  In contrast to De Melo and Tybout (1986) financial liberalization causes a 
downward shift of investment due to increased uncertainty. Interest rates are described as having 
been too high in the liberalization period to foster investment.  According to Voridis’s (1993) 
study of the Greek economy in the financially repressed years between 1963 and 1985 the real 
user cost of capital seems to have had a positive association with private investment.  Morriset 
(1993) reports no significant interest elasticity of private investment for Argentina. He attributes 
this to the crowding-out of private sector credit by public sector demands as a result of a bond 
market collapse.  The latter is due to the increased financialization of savings in the course of 
interest rate liberalization. Thirlwall and Warman (1994) find a negative net effect of real interest 
rates on total investment while the opposite holds for Athukorala (1998) who uses private 
investment. 
As far as the quality of investment is concerned, from the empirical literature a relatively 
clear picture emerges: the studies confirm the hypothesis of a positive association between real 
interest rates and investment efficiency.  In a case study of Colombia, Tybout (1983) conducts a 
firm-level analysis of investment behaviour over the 1973-1976 period.  His findings suggest 
financial market fragmentation: Large firms have relatively easy access to credit and realize 
investment plans irrespective of their own earnings, whereas small firms depend on positive 
earning shocks. So there is considerable variation in the marginal efficiency of capital. Tybout 
concludes that financial liberalization could significantly improve the efficiency of credit 
allocation.  Cho (1988) studies 68 different manufacturing sectors in Korea over the 1972-1984 
period and reports a decline in the disparity of borrowing costs across sectors following the start 
of financial sector reforms in 1980. This is an indication of improved efficiency in the financial 
sector as artificially low interest rates were allowed to move according to market forces. Using 
cross-section regressions, Gelb (1989) finds that real interest rates have an impact on growth 
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rather through the quality (i.e. efficiency) of investment than through quantity. In a micro-level 
study Seabright (1991) analyses credit subsidies to the poor for livestock investment in two 
Indian villages in 1985. He finds that subsidized credit yields lower returns than credit at market 
rates. First of all his results indicate the existence of price discrimination in the livestock market 
because of the lack of anonymity in this rural area. Secondly he finds evidence for the lack of 
ability of some recipients of subsidized credit to manage livestock investment economically at 
this small scale of production. Using Argentinean data for the 1961-1982 period, Morisset (1993) 
finds a significant positive association between investment efficiency and real interest rates.  
All available evidence suggests that financial liberalization policies have yielded mixed 
results, particularly when looking at differences between Asia and Latin America. Diaz-
Alejandro (1985) forcefully challenges the position of McKinnon and Shaw. In his study about 
financial liberalization experiences in Latin American countries he criticises the lack of 
supervision of the financial sector before 1981. Deposit insurance, neglect of prudential 
regulations, admission of new market entrants without banking experience, and other factors 
caused a financial crash like the one in Chile.  Interestingly Ronald McKinnon himself (1989) 
concedes, that “we now recognize that our knowledge of how best to achieve financial 
liberalization remains seriously incomplete”6. He continues to emphasize the importance of 
financial liberalization for an efficient allocation of the economy’s scarce capital. But he 
emphasizes the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard that it can give rise to in immature 
bank markets without appropriate supervision and regulation practices.  In two case studies of 
Chile and Korea he empirically highlights some problems of financial liberalization in the 
context of price stabilization programmes. In Chile real interest rates rose to excessive levels in 
the 1976-82 reform period, which caused severe adverse selection among non-bank borrowers as 
well as moral hazard among the banks themselves. Lack of proper bank supervision contributed 
to the breakdown of the liberalization programme. In contrast to this he shows that in Korea the 
price stabilization programme of the 1979-83 period was deliberately combined with a 
management of nominal interest rates. Along with maintained capital account restrictions and 
appropriate exchange rate policies, the scaling down of nominal interest rates in the course of 
disinflation prevented excessive incentives for foreign capital to move into the Korean economy. 
Therefore a massive build-up of international indebtedness of the country didn’t occur.  
 
6.2. Financial development and economic growth 
 
Evidence for a robust association between financial factors and growth has been 
increasing over time, but the direction of causality has been subject to controversy. Another 
question often raised is what type of financial institution promotes growth. Evidence seems to be 
                                                                 
6 See McKinnon (1989), p. 30. 
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less clear-cut for stock markets than for banks. We outline the findings discussed here in Tables 
A2. and A3. of the Appendix. 
 As for as broad cross-country analysis is concerned, Goldsmith (1969) reports a rough 
correlation between financial development and economic activity for a sample of 35 countries 
covering the period 1860-1963. For roughly 80 countries over the 1960-1989 period King and 
Levine (1993 a, b) find strong evidence that a large set of financial indicators (contemporaneous 
and initial values) is robustly linked with growth, capital accumulation, productivity growth and 
investment ratios. Regressions based on pooled cross-section time-series data with and without 
the use of instruments confirm the findings. King and Levine (1993 c) more specifically state 
that roughly one-third of the gap between very fast and very slow growing countries can be 
eliminated by increasing the size of the financial intermediation sector. In another cross-section 
study De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) explore the relationship between long-run growth and 
financial development. They examine a sample of about 100 countries during 1960-1985 in order 
to conduct growth regressions of the Barro (1991) type. The general finding is that financial 
development is associated with improved growth performance. As far as the analysis of 
subsamples in a cross-section context is concerned, the authors find that the impact of financial 
development increases from high to low-income countries. They subsequently analyse panel data 
of 12 Latin American countries, using six-year averages for 1950-85. Particularly for the 1970s 
and 1980s unregulated financial liberalization and expectations of government bailouts explain a 
reversed relationship between financial development and growth. This result leads to the policy 
recommendation that financial liberalization requires an appropriate regulatory framework in 
order to avoid financial crisis. Finally the authors find empirical support for the hypothesis that 
the main transmission channel from finance to growth is through increasing the efficiency of 
investment, rather than its volume. Berthélemy and Varoudakis (1995) use a sample of 91 
countries for the period of 1960-1985. Using convergence club tests to check for potential 
poverty traps, the authors come to the conclusion that educational attainment is a priority factor 
in this respect. But financial factors may also cause high or low growth equilibria, in other words 
convergence groups with similar long-run growth rates. The empirical results also show that 
inadequate financial conditions may severely inhibit growth in countries, which already have a 
sufficient stock of human capital to start a process of economic development  from.  Ram (1999) 
finds a positive association between financial factors and economic development only for high 
growth countries. Applying panel techniques to a sample of four Latin American and South East 
Asian countries over the period 1965-1985, Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) report that specific 
financial development variables are associated with specific components of growth (i.e. capital 
accumulation and productivity growth). Their results are, however, sensitive to the inclusion of 
country fixed effects. They interpret this finding as an indication that financial factors may proxy 
for broader country characteristics. Deidda and Fattouh (2002) state that financial depth and 
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growth are only associated positively for a high income subsample. They offer the explanation 
that in developing countries the fixed resource cost associated with the provision of financial 
services inhibits growth.  They therefore conclude that there is non- linearity between finance and 
growth.  
A large number of studies are concerned with the question first asked by Patrick (1966): 
What direction does causality between finance and growth run and in which stage of the 
development process does which causality prevail ?  Fritz (1984) uses the Philippines as a 
sample economy to conduct causality tests for a time-series of quarterly date from 1969 till 1981. 
He finds evidence for the hypothesis that in the initial stage of the development process causality 
runs from financial deepening to growth. In the later stages of the process causality is reversed, 
with the real economy demanding an increase in financial services. Using annual data on 56 
countries, 19 of which are industrialized, Jung (1986) conducts time-series based causality tests 
for periods with different lengths. Causality is interpreted both as a simple and as a unidirectional 
concept. He uses two alternative measures of financial development, one is a currency ratio 
(currency over M 1) and the other one a monetization variable (M2 over GDP). For LDCs he 
finds a supply- leading more often than a demand-following pattern (this holds for both causality 
concepts), indicating the importance of financial development for developing countries. The 
opposite is true for DCs, even though only when the currency measure is used. As far as the 
temporal causality pattern is concerned, the findings moderately support Patrick's hypothesis. 
They show a supply-leading pattern first and a demand-following pattern in later stages of the 
development process when the currency ratio is used.  The monetization variable does not 
distinguish developing from developed countries in terms of a temporal causality pattern. There 
is also evidence that LDCs with both higher- and lower-than-average growth rates of GDP are 
more frequently associated with a supply- leading pattern.  The difference between the two 
groups is only that for the high growth subsample the currency variable explains this pattern, 
while for the low growth countries the monetization variable is crucial. Odedokun (1996) 
analyses a sample of  71 developing countries over varying periods that generally span the1960s 
and 1980s in order to generate information about the causality issue. The findings are strongly in 
favour of the "finance causes growth" hypothesis. Using time-series regression analysis, the 
author comes to the conclusion that financial intermediation promotes economic growth in 
roughly 85 Per cent of the countries. Secondly, financial intermediation plays an equally 
important role in promoting growth as other factors, such as export expansion, capital formation 
ratio, and is more important in this context than labour force growth. Thirdly, he observes 
growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation primarily in low-income LDCs. 
Interestingly he finds that growth-promoting patterns of financial intermediation are practically 
invariant across various countries and regions.  Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) cite historical 
evidence from five industrialized countries. Their findings suggest that in the period 1870-1929 
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the USA, the UK, Canada, Norway and Sweden experienced rapid industrialization driven by 
financial factors. Vector error correction and vector auto regression models both detect a leading 
role of financial intermediation variables in real sector activity without significant feedback 
effects. The pattern applies in general, while the nature of the links varies somewhat across 
countries. Wang (1999) presents a case study of Taiwan for the period 1961-1999. He shows that 
marginal spillovers from the financial to the real sector are larger on average than vice versa, but 
decrease over time and relative to marginal spillovers from the real sector.  He interprets this as 
an indication that finance caused growth in earlier stages of Taiwan’s economic development 
while the relationship was reversed later on. Some studies, however, come to a different 
conclusion with respect to the causality issue. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) also conduct 
causality tests between financial development and real GDP for 16 less developed countries, 
using time-series techniques. Their findings provide little support for the hypothesis that 
financial factors play a leading role in the process of economic development. There is more 
evidence for the opposite pattern (i.e. growth causing financial development) and for bi-
directional causality. Another important finding of their study is that causality patterns vary 
across countries, indicating a need for case studies and careful time-series analysis. Examples for 
bi-directional causality are Korea and Thailand, two countries with successful financial reforms. 
In a case study of India Demetriades and Luintel (1996) show empirical links between banking 
sector controls and the process of financial deepening, and between financial deepening and 
growth. Banking sector controls are measured by interest rate controls, reserve and liquidity 
requirements and directed credit programmes. For a period from 1961 till 1991 the empirical 
results suggest that, except for lending rate ceilings, these controls had a negative impact on 
financial development in India. Furthermore the authors also find a bi-directional causality 
between financial development and economic activity. Luintel and Khan (1999) apply a 
multivariate vector auto regression framework to a sample of ten mostly developing countries 
over a period of 36-41 years and find evidence for bi-directional causality for all countries. 
Harrison, Sussman and Zeira (1999) finally use US state-level data for the period 1965-1995 to 
show that there is a feedback effect between finance and growth: growth reduces the cost of 
financial intermediation by attracting new market entrants, by reducing monitoring costs and by 
promoting specialization. This in turn increases investment and growth.   
Some empirical studies are concerned with specific aspects of financial development. 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992, s.a.) present evidence on the relationship between financial 
repression and growth. Using a cross-section of 98 countries for the period 1960-1985, they 
show that various measures of financial repression affect growth negatively. Inflation rates and 
reserve ratios are negatively correlated with growth after controlling for other factors. A regional 
dummy for Latin America tends to be insignificant after controlling for financial repression, 
suggesting that the latter partly explains the low growth in these countries. They also find 
 20 
empirical support for the hypothesis that strongly negative real interest rates (below minus 5% 
per year) are significantly associated with low growth rates. This finding does not hold for 
moderately negative real interest.  The authors interpret this as an indication that only severe 
financial repression inhibits growth. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) use US state-level data since 
1972 to analyse the impact of intrastate bank branch reform on growth. Banks and bank holding 
companies used to face restrictions on geographical expansion both within and across state 
borders. Starting in the middle of the 1970s most states have deregulated these restrictions 
significantly. The main idea of this study is that the deregulation has reduced the average costs of 
financial intermediation by increasing the efficiency of banks and by improving the quality of 
intermediation. The results show that growth accelerated following reforms. The loan quality 
also improved, whereas there was no impact on saving and investment. Mattesini (1996) uses the 
lending-deposit spread as a proxy for monitoring cost related to asymmetric information. His 
estimates refer to the period 1978-1992 and a sample of forty countries. The spread is 
particularly significant in explaining the growth performance for the whole sample and for the 
subsample of developed economies.  For the low-income subsample, however, there is no 
significant relation between the spread and growth. The author attributes this to the existence of 
financial repression in developing countries, which may also affect the size of the spread. 
A number of studies deal specifically with stock market indicators. Atje and Jovanovic 
(1993, s.a.) test the implication of their model empirically for a sample of 40 developing and 
developed countries. Using two proxies of financial development, one measuring bank 
intermediation and one approximating stock market activity, only the latter turns out to perform 
well. They find no evidence for level effects. Therefore the authors conclude that stock markets 
improve long-run growth in per capita GDP. In contrast to that, Harris (1997) comes to the 
conclusion that stock market activity has at best weak explanatory power for long-run growth in 
per capita output. He uses data on 49 of the 60 countries that had official stock markets in 1991, 
covering the period 1980-1991. The paper is a direct response to Atje and Jovanovic (1993) and 
criticizes their methodology. Harris uses a specification of the regression equation with current 
instead of lagged investment. By multiplying the initial level of stock market activity (value 
traded) with lagged investment and by entering the latter also as a separate variable, Atje and 
Jovanovic want to account for endogeneity of the variables. Harris essentially uses the same 
econometric model, but argues that their approach is not appropriate because lagged and current 
investment are not sufficiently correlated with each other. Instead he proposes the use of 
instruments to account for the endogeneity of current investment. The effect of stock markets he 
finds is therefore much weaker. Splitting the sample into developed and developing countries 
yields a slightly different result.  For the developing countries stock markets do not seem to 
promote long-run growth, whereas for the developed countries they have some explanatory 
power. Levine and Zervos (1998) use data on a cross-section of 47 countries from 1976 to 1993 
 21 
to assess the impact of variables measuring stock market activity on growth, capital 
accumulation, productivity improvements, and private savings. They find a robust positive 
correlation between stock market liquidity, measured by initial value traded scaled by GDP and 
initial turnover ratio (value traded scaled by average market capitalization), and current and 
future rates of GDP growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. Other variables, like 
stock market size, volatility, and integration in world capital markets are not robustly linked with 
growth. Entering stock market liquidity and banking development (measuring bank loans to the 
private sector over GDP) simultaneously into a regression yield significant results for both. The 
authors interpret this as an indication that banks and stock markets provide different services. 
There is no significant impact of any financial variable on the volume of private savings. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) confirm these findings using data for 47 countries over the period 
1980-1995.  To account for potential endogeneity between growth and finance they apply a two-
stage least squares regression approach. The findings of their cross-section regressions suggest 
an impact of value traded, but not of market capitalization,  (both scaled by GDP) on growth. 
Using a panel vector auto regression specification, they find evidence for causality running from 
both stock market indicators (per capita value traded and market capitalization, scaled by a price 
index) to economic activity. Value traded turns out to be particularly significant.  They 
eventually show that the adjustment of the stock market indicators with a general price index 
overstates the effect of market capitalization on economic activity. Instead a share price index 
should be used to deflate the data, because asset price booms may overstate actual market depth. 
Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel (2001) conduct time-series analysis using data on five 
industrialized countries covering the period 1968-1998. They use measures like stock market 
capitalization (scaled by GDP) and volatility for all countries, but value traded (scaled by GDP) 
and turnover ratio only for the UK and the USA. They report that stock markets have made 
significant contributions to growth in Germany, Japan, and France. The effect of stock markets, 
however, is weaker than the impact of banking. For the USA and the UK the link between 
finance and growth is not very robust and rather seems to run from growth to finance. 
Summing up the results of the empirical literature it becomes evident that country studies 
and time-series analysis provide less clear-cut results than cross-section regression techniques. 
Studies using the latter technique generally yield results that are interpreted in favour of the 
"finance causes growth" hypothesis. Authors using time-series analysis and causality test 
methods, however, come to less uniform conclusions: In general the view, that finance causes 
growth in earlier stages of economic development and vice versa in more advanced stages of 
industrialization, prevails. This is in line with Patrick’s hypothesis. A significant number of 
studies, however, detect bi-directional causality, which is empirically important in the context of 
studies about multiple equilibria. The results for stock markets are less clear-cut then for banks. 
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The existence of a general and significant pattern linking stock markets with growth cannot be 
concluded from the literature. 
 
7. Summary 
 
In this paper we reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on links between 
domestic financial development and economic growth.  Patrick first raised the question "what 
causes what in which stage of the development process ?" in 1966.  The causality issue has been 
crucial ever since. Early pioneers like Goldsmith did not provide a strong enough theoretical 
fundament to give a satisfactory answer. In the 1970s McKinnon and Shaw developed a 
theoretical framework that helped to explain growth-inducing effects of financial liberalization in 
contrast to financial repression. They argued that the financial sector could raise the volume of 
savings as well as the quantity and quality of investment. This approach found only mixed 
empirical support and could not explain sustained increases in the growth rate of an economy 
either.  Micro- and macroeconomic concerns added to these empirical findings. The answer 
economic theory gave to these questions was incorporated in the endogenous growth literature of 
the 1990s. It emphasizes the role of financial development in generating sustained growth 
through an external effect on aggregate investment efficiency. Some authors have developed a 
framework for reciprocal externalities between the financial and the real sector.  Much empirical 
support has been found for the “finance promotes growth” view, but time-series evidence is less 
clear-cut than broad cross-section analysis. A majority of studies, however, comes to the 
conclusion that finance induces growth in early stages of economic development and vice versa 
in more advanced stages. A lot of evidence for bi-directional causality has been found as well.  A 
specific role has been attributed to stock markets, but here in particular, the evidence is mixed.  It 
seems that individual countries have to be studied deliberately and that general conclusions have 
to be treated with caution. The role of international finance in inducing economic development, 
not considered here at all, remains an even more controversial issue. 
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Appendix A1. 
Table A1.: Overview of empirical findings on financial liberalization, savings, and investment 
Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Boskin 
 
 
 
 
1978 
 
USA time-
series data 
 
1929-1969 
 
gross private savings rate 
 
real after-tax rate of return in various 
definitions 
 
a variety of functional forms 
and estimation techniques lead 
to the conclusion of 
substantial interest elasticity 
of saving 
 
Fry 
 
 
 
 
1978 
 
pooled time -
series data of 
seven Asian 
LDCs  
 
1962-1972 
 
domestic savings rate 
 
real interest rate in various definitions 
 
real interest rate exerts 
positive effect on saving 
 
Giovannini 
 
1983 
 
 
see Fry 
(1978) 
 
1964-1980 
 
 
 
aggregate domestic  
savings rate 
 
 
 
real interest rate 
 
significantly positive interest 
elasticity of saving cannot be 
reproduced even though the 
specifi-cations are the same as 
in Fry (1978) 
 
Tybout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1983 
 
Colombia, 
firm-level 
data of small 
and large 
manufactu-
ring firms  
 
 
1973-1976 
 
firm investment 
 
access to credit market 
 
results suggest financial 
market fragmentation: large 
firms have relatively easy 
access to credit and realize 
investment plans irrespective 
of their own earnings, small 
firms invest only in case of 
favourable earning shocks, so 
there is considerable variation 
in marginal efficiency of 
investment,  
financial liberalization may 
significantly improve the 
efficiency of credit allocation 
and thus the efficiency of 
investment 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
De Melo/ 
Tybout 
 
 
 
 
 
1986 
 
Uruguay 
 
1962-1983 
 
total savings rate 
 
private investment rate 
 
real interest rate 
 
significant but small positive 
effect of real interest rate on 
saving, upward shift of 
savings rate with 
implementation of financial 
liberalization (1973),  
no effect in post- financial 
liberalization period,  
private investment found to be 
associated positively with 
interest rates, especially in 
post-reform period, reform 
also led to upward shift of 
investment 
 
Gupta 
 
 
 
 
 
1986 
 
India, South 
Korea 
 
1960-1981 
 
various indicators of  
private savings  
 
various indicators of  
economic activity 
 
nominal interest rate 
 
inflation rate  
 
financial liberalization has a 
positive impact on financial 
development and growth in 
the simulations for the two 
countries, but different policy 
prescriptions are needed to 
achieve the same degree of 
financial liberalization, 
in India nominal interest rate 
increases had a stronger 
impact than a reduction in 
inflation, Korea exhibited 
opposite pattern 
 
  
Gupta 
 
 
 
 
1987 
 
22 Asian and 
Latin 
American 
countries 
 
 
1967-1976 
 
aggregate real savings 
 
nominal interest rate 
 
pooling across countries is 
inappropriate, for Asia the 
nominal interest rate is 
positively associated with 
saving, there is no effect for 
Latin America 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Cho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1988 
 
Korea,       
68 manufac-
turing 
sectors 
 
1972-1984 
 
no regression approach, 
borrowing costs and their  
variance across sectors are  
crucial indicator 
 
  
disparity of borrowing costs 
across sectors declined 
following the start of financial 
liberalization in 1980, this is 
interpreted as improvement in 
efficiency of investment 
 
Gelb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1989 
 
34 
 
1965-1985 
 
real GDP growth 
 
efficiency of investment 
(incremental output-capital 
ratio=IOCR) 
 
investment rate 
(investment/GDP=IGDP) 
 
ratio of financial savings 
to total savings=RFSTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
real interest rate=RR 
 
depth (M3/GDP=M3GDP) 
 
real interest rates and GDP 
growth are positively 
correlated, efficiency of 
investment (IOCR) is more 
strongly correlated with real 
interest rates than the quantity 
of investment (IGDP), much 
of the positive relationship 
between real interest rates and 
growth reflects reversed 
causality, but the effect of the 
financial sector on growth is 
still significant,  this causal 
chain operates through the 
impact of real interest rates on 
the financialization of savings 
(RSFTS) and subsequently on 
the efficiency of investment 
(IOCR) and growth, 
depth has additional 
explanatory power, without 
weakening the interest rate 
effect 
 
 
Laumas 
 
 
 
1990 
 
India 
 
1954-1975 
 
private investment ratio 
 
real interest rate 
 
positive relationship between 
private investment and real 
interest rate 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Seabright 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
two Indian 
villages 
 
1985 
 
various measures of return   
to investment  
 
credit subsidies to poor for livestock 
investment 
 
 
 
subsidized credit yields lower 
return than credit at market 
rates because of price 
discrimination in livestock 
market and inability of some 
subsidy recipients to manage 
livestock investment 
economically 
 
 
Rittenberg 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 
 
Turkey 
 
1964-1986 
 
various private investment 
indicators 
 
real interest rate 
 
for negative (below 
equilibrium) real interest rates: 
positive effect of real interest 
rates on investment 
for positive (above 
equilibrium) real interest rates: 
negative effect of real interest 
rates on investment 
in liberalization period interest 
rates may have been too high 
to foster investment, moreover 
a structural downward shift of 
investment may have occurred 
due to increased uncertainty 
resulting from liberalization 
 
 
Athukorala/ 
Rajapatirana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
1960-1987 
 
a) financial saving=savings  
and time deposits (real) 
held  
by non-bank private sector  
 
b) total saving=real private  
saving 
 
 
a) nominal weighted average interest 
rate on savings and time deposits        
 
b) real weighted average interest rate 
on savings and time deposits  
 
strong effect of interest rates 
on both financial savings and 
total private savings for post-
liberalization period (1978-
1987), private savings rate 
increased by roughly six 
percentage points on average 
for pre- and post- reform 
periods 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Bayoumi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 
 
United 
Kindom, 11 
standard 
regions 
 
1971-1988 
 
regional household 
savings rates 
 
 
 
national real interest rate 
 
regional rates of return on housing 
 
financial deregulation and 
innovation reduced savings 
rate by about 2.25 percentage 
points over the 1980s, the 
reduction being partly 
permanent and partly 
temporary, crucial factor is 
relaxation of credit constraints 
as result of financial reforms  
 
 
Voridis  
 
 
 
 
1993 
 
Greece 
 
1963-1985 
 
various private investment 
indicators 
 
real user cost 
 
real user cost effects on 
private investment found to be 
positive for financially 
repressed Greek economy of 
respective period 
 
 
Morriset 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 
 
Argentina 
 
1961-1982 
 
incremental output/capital  
ratio (IOCR)  
 
real money stock (M 3) 
 
real savings (private  
investment and  
government bonds) 
 
real foreign assets  
(capital flight) 
 
private investment 
 
 
 
 
real interest rate 
 
significant positive association 
between investment efficiency 
(IOCR) and real interest rate, 
positive impact of real interest 
rate on real money, negative 
impact of real interest rate on 
real savings (bond market 
collapse result of 
financialization of savings, 
government needs bank credit 
instead), real interest rates 
negatively associated with 
capital flight, no significant 
interest elasticity of private 
investment because credit to 
private sector crowded out by 
public sector due to bond 
market collapse 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Warman/ 
Thirlwall 
 
 
 
 
 
1994 
 
Mexico 
 
1960-1990 
 
financial saving 
 
total domestic saving 
 
total private saving 
 
investment 
 
 
real interest rate 
 
financial saving is positively 
related to real interest rates 
partly through domestic asset 
substitution and partly through 
capital flight 
 
total and private savings are 
not significantly associated 
with interest rates  
 
the net effect of interest rates 
on investment is  negative 
 
 
 
Athukorala 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998 
 
India 
 
1955-1995 
 
financial saving 
 
total domestic saving 
 
total private saving 
 
private investment 
 
 
 
real interest rate 
 
higher real interest rates seem 
to promote both financial and 
total saving, and stimulate 
investment  
 
there is no evidence for 
significant substitution of 
other assets for financial assets  
 
the interest elasticity of total 
private saving is greater in 
magnitude compared to that of 
total domestic saving which 
includes public sector saving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
35  
Table A2.: Overview of empirical findings on banking sector development and economic growth 
Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Goldsmith 
 
 
 
 
1969 
 
35, all 
groups 
 
1860-1963 
 
real GNP p.c. 
 
Financial Development 
FIR (˜ domestic credit/GNP) 
 
rough correlation between 
financial development and 
growth 
 
 
Fritz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1984 
 
Philippines 
 
1969-1981 
 
financial development 
(FD)= composite financial  
development index with 10 
weighted sub-indicators 
 
economic development 
(ED)=composite economic  
development indicator with 
7 weighted sub-indicators 
 
ED 
 
 
 
 
FD 
 
early stages of economic 
development:  
finance causes growth 
 
 
more advanced stages of 
economic development: 
growth causes finance 
 
Jung 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1986 
 
56, of 
which: 
 
37 DCs and 
19 LDCs  
 
1950-1980 
 
depth(M2/GDP)=M 
 
currency/M1=C 
 
real p.c. GDP=Y 
 
Y 
 
M 
 
C 
 
finance causes growth: 
more frequently found for 
LDCs  
 
growth causes finance: 
more frequently found for 
industrialized countries 
 
temporal causality pattern: 
first finance causes growth, 
then vice versa (holds only for 
variable C), in both  high and 
low growth LDCs finance 
causes growth pattern prevails, 
but different financial 
indicators are crucial 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Roubini/ 
Sala -i -
Martin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1992 
 
98, 
all  groups 
 
1960-1985 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
financial repression: 
 
finrep (real interest rate distortion: 
1=positive, 2=<0 and >-5, 3=<-5) 
 
finrep 1= dummy for real interest 
rate <0 
 
finrep 2= dummy for real interest     
rate <-5% 
 
reserve (ratio of commercial bank 
reserves to money supply) 
 
inflation rate 
 
distort  (overall price distortions) 
 
 
coefficients have right sign 
(negative) 
 
significance for most 
variables, exceptions are: 
 
finrep 1(not significant) 
 
reserve (weak significance) 
 
result: strong financial 
repression inhibits growth 
 
King/ 
Levine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 a 
 
77 for 
average 
values 
 
 
 
57 for initial 
values of 
depth 
variable 
 
1960-1989 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
growth in capital stock 
 
productivity growth 
 
investment share (of GDP) 
 
 
average/initial data for: 
 
depth=(M3/GDP), M2 if M3 not avail. 
 
bank=(deposit money bank domestic 
credit / deposit money bank domestic 
credit + central bank domestic credit) 
 
private=(credit to private sector /total 
domestic credit) 
 
privy=(credit to private sector/GDP) 
 
average data: strong 
significance for all 
coefficients in cross-section 
regressions 
 
initial data: initial values of 
depth  also highly significant 
in cross-section regressions 
 
in pooled cross-section time- 
series regressions also strong 
significance for all four 
financial indicators, only 
private has weaker signficance 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
King/ 
Levine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 b 
 
92, 
case studies: 
Chile, 
Korea, 
Philippines, 
Argentina, 
Indonesia 
 
1960-1989 
 
see King/Levine 1993 a 
 
see King/Levine 1993 a 
cross-section: initial and contempo-
raneous values of depth 
three-stage least squares (pooled cross-
section time-series): initial values of 
financial indicators as instruments 
case studies: no regression, only values 
for financial development pre and post 
reforms  
 
initial and average values of 
depth significant in cross-
section regressions, 
all financial indicators 
significant in three-stage 
regressions (refinement of 
King/Levine 1993 a) 
case studies:  financial sector 
reforms lead to higher level of 
financial development 
 
 
King/ 
Levine 
 
 
 
 
1993 c 
 
64-88, 
very rich, 
rich, 
poor, very 
poor 
 
1960-1989 
 
see King/Levine 1993 a 
 
(see King/Levine 1993a for all 
variables) 
 
depth , bank, private  
 
 
average data: significance for 
nearly all coefficients 
 
initial data: less significant 
results, strong significance 
only for depth 
 
 
De Gregorio/ 
Guidotti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
about 100, 
 
panel data of 
12 Latin 
American 
countries 
 
1960-1985 
 
1950-1985 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
credit (domestic credit to the private 
sector / GDP) 
 
whole sample: positively 
related, primarily through 
increased efficiency instead of 
volume of investment 
 
subsamples: impact of 
financial development 
increases significantly from 
high to low income countries 
 
Latin America: credit 
significantly negatively related 
with growth because of 
liberalization in poor 
regulatory environment 
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Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Berthélemy/ 
Varoudakis  
 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
91, all 
groups 
 
1960-1985 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
depth (M2/GDP) (initial values) 
 
strong significance, threshold 
effects result in convergence 
clubs with similar long-run 
growth within each group, this 
implies the existence of 
poverty traps 
 
 
Jayaratne/ 
Strahan 
 
 
 
1996 
 
US state-
level data 
 
since 1972 
 
real p.c. growth of personal  
income and gross state 
product 
 
intrastate bank branch reform 
(=relaxation of bank branch 
restrictions) 
 
growth accelerated after 
intrastate branching reform 
 
branch reform led to 
improvements in loan quality, 
but not to increased savings 
and investment 
 
 
Demetriades/ 
Hussein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
panel data of 
16 less 
developed 
countries 
 
at least 27 
continuous 
annual  
obser-
vations 
 
real p.c. GDP  
 
bank deposit liabilities to nominal GDP 
 
bank claims on private sector to 
nominal GDP 
 
Evidence from ECM and 
VAR analysis suggests:  
finance causes growth: little  
growth causes finance: :much 
bi-directionality: very much 
patterns vary strongly across 
countries 
 
 
Mattesini 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
40 countries 
subsamples 
high income 
low income 
 
 
 
1978-1992 
 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
monitoring costs: 
lending-deposit spread averaged 78-92 
 
negative association between 
growth and spreads 
whole sample: very significant 
high income subsample: very 
significant 
low income subsample: not 
significant  
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Odedokun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
71 
developing 
countries 
 
various 
60s, 80s 
 
real GDP growth 
 
depth (liquid liabilities over GDP) 
multiplied by growth rate of real liquid 
liabilities (=M3/GDP*growth of M3) 
M2 used where M3 not available 
 
positive and signficant relation 
in    45 % of panel countries, 
positive and insignificant 
relation in 39 % of panel 
countries, 
significance especially in low 
income LDCs  
 
 
Demetriades/ 
Luintel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
India 
 
1961-1991 
 
financial depth (=bank  
deposit liabilities/GDP) 
 
real p.c. GDP 
 
banking sector controls (interest rate 
controls, reserve and liquidity 
requirements, directed credit 
programmes)  
 
financial depth 
 
banking sector controls 
inhibited financial deepening 
 
bi-directional causality 
between finance and economic 
activity 
 
 
 
Rousseau/ 
Wachtel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998 
 
USA, UK, 
Canada, 
Norway, 
Sweden 
 
1870-1929 
 
real p.c. GDP 
 
monetary base 
 
financial intensity  
(=various indicators of  
financial development) 
 
 
real per-capita GDP 
 
monetary base 
 
financial intensity 
 (=various indicators of financial 
development) 
 
 
 
VECM and VAR 
specifications suggest that for 
all countries similarly: 
(1) financial intensity 
measures share long-run 
features with output and 
monetary base 
 
(2) financial intensity 
measures Granger-cause real 
output, with little evidence of 
feedback effects 
 
(3) VECMs suggest positive 
response of output to increases 
in financial intensity, not vice 
versa 
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Ram 
 
 
 
 
1999 
 
95, 
 
subsamples: 
high, 
medium, 
low growth 
 
1960-1989 
 
real GDP growth 
 
depth (liquid liabilities/GDP) 
 
individual countries (time-
series): 
negative sign and insigificance 
dominate 
 
cross-country: huge 
parametric heterogeneity 
across three subgroups, 
positive association only for 
high growth subsample 
 
Luintel/Khan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 
 
10,  
 
nearly all 
developing 
countries 
 
36-41 
years over 
1951 – 
1995 
period 
 
real p.c. GDP (LYP) 
 
real p.c. capital stock 
(LKP) 
 
financial depth (FD) =total  
deposit liabilities of deposit 
banks/first lag of GDP 
 
real interest rate (R) 
 
R 
 
 
FD 
 
 
LKP 
 
 
LYP 
 
results of multivariate vector 
auto regression (VAR) suggest 
bi-directional causality 
between financial and real 
sector for all countries 
 
Wang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 
 
Taiwan 
 
1961-1999 
 
marginal spillovers 
 
(1) finance leading 
 version : 
(2) real sector leading  
version: 
R=real goods sector output  
F=financial sector output 
 
depth=(liquid liablities/GDP) 
 
share of formal financial sector in total 
financial sector 
 
interest rate difference between formal 
and informal financial sector 
 
finance leading version 
dominates 
for Taiwan on average, 
i.e.(1)>(2), 
but marginal spillovers from 
finance decrease over time 
relative to marginal spillovers 
from the real sector, this 
means finance caused growth 
in earlier stages of Taiwan's 
economic development, while 
the relationship was reversed 
later on  
FR ¶¶ /
 R F ¶ ¶ / 
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Harrison/ 
Sussman/ 
Zeira 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 
 
US state-
level data 
 
1965-1995 
 
 
COST/GLL=cost of 
 financial intermediation  
(banks' operational   
expenses/gross loans and 
leases)  
 
GSP/CAPITA= real gross 
state product per capita 
 
GSP/CAPITA 
 
COST/GLL 
 
set of instruments to isolate the effect 
of COST/GLL on GSP/CAPITA, i.e. to 
exogenize GSP/CAPITA  
 
 
cross-state regressions show a 
significant negative relation 
between the cost of financial 
intermediation and economic 
development, causality tests 
and two-stage regressions 
confirm the hypothesis of 
feedback effect between 
finance and growth: growth 
reduces the cost of financial 
intermediation and this in turn 
increases investment and 
growth 
 
 
Benhabib/ 
Spiegel 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 
 
Argentina, 
Chile, 
Korea, 
Indonesia, 
panel data 
 
1965-1985 
 
real GDP growth 
 
investment share (of GDP) 
 
difference in years of  
schooling per worker  
(= total factor productivity 
 growth) 
 
 
depth 
 
bank 
 
privy (see King/Levine 1993 a for 
definitions) 
 
interactive terms:  
depth*gdp                         
depth*gini 
 
indicators of financial 
development are significantly 
positively associated with 
growth, different financial 
variables are associated with 
different components of 
growth, results are sensitive to 
country fixed effects, which 
may indicate that the financial 
variables proxy for broader 
country characteristics  
 
 
Deidda/ 
Fattouh 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
119 
 
1960-1989 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
financial depth (liquid liabilities over 
GDP), initial and contemporaneous 
regressions, 
see King/Levine 1993 a for definition 
of liquid liabilities 
 
no significant relationship 
between financial depth and 
economic growth in low 
income sample, only for high 
income sample regressions 
confirm positive association of 
finance and growth 
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Table A3.: Overview of empirical findings on stock market development and economic growth 
Author Year Countries Period Main dependent variable Main independent variables Results 
 
Atje/ 
Jovanovic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 
 
94 (bank 
variable) 
40 (stock 
market 
variable),  
all groups 
 
1966-1988 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
 
B*I, S*I , I 
 
B=public and private credit to GDP 
S=value traded ratio (=annual value of 
all stock market trades/GDP) 
I=investment/GDP ratio 
initial values of S, lagged values of B, I 
because of endogeneity 
 
regressions confirm 
significant impact for stock 
market variable (S*I), but not 
for indicator of bank 
development (B*I) 
 
 
 
Harris  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 
 
49, all 
groups, 
subsamples 
developed 
and less 
developed 
countries 
 
1980-1991 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
S*I,  I 
                     
S=value traded ratio 
I=investment/GDP 
difference to Atje/Jovanovic (1993): 
I=current value 
S=initial value 
whole sample: insignificant 
less developed subsample: 
insignificant 
developed subsample: weak 
significance,  
lagged investment is bad 
proxy for current investment, 
so current investment with 
instruments is used in 2SLS 
regression to solve 
endogeneity problem 
 
Levine/ 
Zervos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998 
 
47 all groups 
of countries 
 
1976-1993 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
growth in capital stock p.c. 
 
productivity growth 
 
gross private savings rate 
 
stock market liquidity= 
 
value traded ratio in 1976 (definition 
see above) 
turnover ratio in 1976 (=total value of 
domestic shares traded/market 
capitalization) 
 
initial level of stock market 
liquidity is significant 
predictor for all components 
of growth, initial levels of 
other variables (market 
capitalization, stock return 
volatility, stock market 
integration) are not robustly 
linked with growth, none of 
financial indicators is closely 
associated with savings rate 
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Rousseau/ 
Wachtel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 
 
47 
 
1980-1995 
 
cross-section (TSLS): 
 
real p.c. GDP growth 
 
panel (VAR): 
 
real p.c. GDP 
 
market capitalization/GDP 
 
value traded/GDP 
 
p.c. value traded 
 
p.c. market capitalization 
 
(both indicators share-price vs. general 
price-level adjusted) 
 
real p.c. M 3 
 
 
two-stage cross-section 
estimates suggest impact on 
growth of value traded, not 
market capitalization 
 
panel VAR results indicate 
causality running from both 
stock market indicators to 
economic activity, in 
particular value traded, but 
general price-level adjustment 
overstates effect of market 
capitalization, accordingly 
liquidity of stock markets is 
more important than size  
 
M3 as indicator of banking 
also significant 
 
 
Arestis/ 
Demetriades/ 
Luintel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
Germany, 
USA, Japan, 
UK, France 
 
periods 
covering 
1968-1998 
 
real GDP (LY) 
 
stock market capitalization/GDP 
(LMC) 
 
domestic bank credit/GDP (LBY) 
 
stock market volatility (SMV) 
 
alternative for UK and USA only: 
 
stock market value traded/GDP (TRY) 
 
stock market turnover ratio (TRMV) 
 
 
Germany, Japan, France: 
stock markets have made 
significant contributions to 
output growth, but banks were 
more important 
 
USA, UK: 
link between finance and 
growth found to be weak and 
to run from growth to 
financial development, 
alternative measures confirm 
results 
 
